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I. INTRODUCTION 
Three white men in rural Saskatchewan pick up a twelve-year-old 
aboriginal girl.  After giving her four drinks, all three men attempt to 
have intercourse with her.  Only one of the men is convicted of sexual 
assault and he is given a two-year sentence to be served in the 
community.  The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal upholds both the 
conviction and the sentence.1  In Calgary, a homeless and drug-addicted 
woman blacks out, awakening in an inner city park to find a man beating 
and raping her.  She yells “I’m being raped” and is heard by a passerby.  
The man is acquitted.2  In inner city Edmonton, a passing driver notices 
an unconscious woman on the sidewalk.  Two men are in the process of 
∗ Associate Professor, Women’s Studies, University of Alberta, Canada. Email: 
lise.gotell@ualberta.ca.  I am grateful to colleagues involved in the LSA Berlin 2007 panel “The 
Epistemology of Consent in Rape Law,” where the ideas developed in this article were first 
presented.  Emma Cunliffe, the discussant on this panel, provided invaluable comments on the 
Berlin paper.  I am also grateful to Jane Campbell Moriarty for the invitation to contribute to this 
important symposium issue. 
 1. R. v. Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270 (Sask. C.A. 2005). 
 2. R. v. M.S., [2003] A.J. No. 1516, (Alta. Prov. Ct. Nov. 27, 2003). 
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fondling her breasts.  The men are first convicted of sexual assault, and 
then acquitted on summary appeal.3  The Alberta Court of Appeal later 
restores the initial convictions.4 
These cases deal with different questions within sexual assault law: 
age of consent and the adequacy of a sentence; findings of fact and 
questions of credibility; and the validity of the defense of prior consent 
when a victim loses consciousness.  While I offer insights on these 
issues, my intent is not to analyze the status of Canadian doctrine in any 
single area.  Instead, I use these cases to critically interrogate new 
standards for consent and the construction of victims who occupy and 
inhabit spaces of risk. 
To further provide a foundation for this analysis, I first trace the 
development of an affirmative consent standard in Canadian law.  While 
the struggle for affirmative consent is typically framed as a feminist law 
reform project,5 I contend that we need to understand the legal 
elaboration of a positive and explicit consent standard in relation to 
wider shifts in governance.  The second section of this article explores 
how the legal elaboration of affirmative consent in Canadian law might 
be seen as a specific expression of neoliberal governmentality, forging 
new normative sexual subjects who interact within a transactional sexual 
economy.  In section three, I demonstrate how discourses of 
responsibilization and risk management inform recent Canadian sexual 
assault decisions, constituting the ideal victim as the rape-preventing 
subject who exercises appropriate caution (yet fails) and the normative 
masculine sexual subject as he who avoids the risk of criminalization 
through securing consent.  Just as new consent norms prescribe 
privileged sexual subjectivities and new conceptions of good/credible 
victims, so too do they produce new mechanisms for discrediting claims 
of sexual assault.  In the final section of this article, I interrogate the 
reconstruction of the good victim/bad complainant dichotomy in 
Canadian judicial discourses.  As I suggest, the opposite of the rape-
 3. R. v. Ashlee, [2005] A.J. No. 1952, (ABQB June 9, 2005). 
 4. R. v. Ashlee, [2006] A.J. No. 1040, (Alta. C.A. Aug. 23, 2006). 
 5. See, for example, Dan Subotnik’s critique where he characterizes affirmative consent as a 
feminist imposition on criminal law.  Dan Subotnik, “Hands Off”: Sex, Feminism, Affirmative 
Consent, and the Law of Foreplay, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 249, 293-97 (2007).  Those 
who build a reform case for affirmative consent from a specifically feminist stance include, but are 
not limited to: Lois Pineau, A Response to My Critics, in DATE RAPE 63, 63 (Leslie Francis ed., 
Pennsylvania State University Press 1996); Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and 
Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J.L. & GEN. 381, 437-39 (2005); Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1421 (2005); Katherine K. Baker, Gender and Emotion in Criminal Law, 
28 HARV. J.L. & GEN. 447, 453-54 (2005). 
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preventing subject is the “risky woman” who avoids personal 
responsibility for sexual safety and who “chooses” to engage in a “high-
risk lifestyle.”  The sharp descent into the space of risk is a feature in 
cases involving aboriginal women, women with addictions, and 
homeless women.  By considering three illustrative cases in some depth, 
I demonstrate how such “risky women” appear to surrender their status 
as legal subjects capable of having their refusals recognized in law.  
Under the shadow of affirmative consent, standards of good victimhood 
are currently being revised.  Now less tied to chastity and sexual 
propriety, constructions of good/credible victims are nonetheless built 
upon exclusions that draw upon persistent race and class-based 
ideologies, reconstructing vulnerability as responsibility. 
II. AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT IN CANADIAN LAW 
Canadian law regarding nonconsensual sexual interaction has 
changed dramatically in the past several years, mostly due to statutory 
amendments and to changes in the common law.  In 1992, after the 
Supreme Court of Canada struck down restrictions on sexual history 
evidence as a violation of constitutional legal rights,6 Parliament re-
enacted a weakened form of “rape shield provisions” that complied with 
the Court’s insistence on scope for judicial discretion.7  Largely due to 
feminist lobbying,8 this reform initiative also clarified the law of consent 
in a manner intended to reduce the possible uses of sexual history 
evidence.  For the first time, a statutory definition of consent as a 
voluntary agreement was embedded in the Criminal Code.9  The Code 
 6. R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 (Can.). 
 7. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), 1992 S.C., ch. 38 (Can.); Criminal 
Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 (1985) [hereinafter CC]. The admission of sexual history evidence solely to 
show that the complainant was more likely to have consented or is less worthy of belief was 
prohibited.  Id.  S. 276 requires that, to be admitted, evidence must be relevant to an issue at trial, 
and that it must have significant probative value that is not “substantially outweighed by the danger 
of prejudice to the proper administration of justice.”  Id.  In determining relevance and probative 
value, the judge must consider such factors as the right to make full answer and defense, society's 
interest in reporting, the importance of eliminating any discriminatory beliefs from the fact finding 
process, the risk that the evidence will arouse prejudice, the prejudice to the complainant's privacy 
and dignity, and the right to personal security and protection of the law.  Id.   
 8. A broad-based consultation with feminist anti-violence activists preceded the 1992 sexual 
assault law reform.  For discussion of the consultations that shaped this reform, see Sheila McIntyre, 
Redefining Reformism: The Consultations that Shaped C-49, in CONFRONTING SEXUAL ASSAULT: A 
DECADE OF SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHANGE 293, 293-310 (Julian Robers & Renate Mohr eds., 
University of Toronto Press 1994). 
 9. Consent is defined as “the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual 
activity in question.” CC § 273(1)(2).  It is also important to note that there is no longer a crime of 
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enumerated situations of forced submission that do not constitute 
consent (including when agreement is expressed by another person, 
when the complainant is “incapable of consenting,” when the accused 
abuses a position of power, trust, or authority, and when the complainant 
expresses a lack of agreement to engage or continue to engage in the 
sexual activity).10  Finally, the defense of mistaken belief was limited by 
a new requirement that the accused must have taken “reasonable steps” 
to ensure consent and by specifying that there can be no such defense 
when this belief arises through “recklessness” or “willful blindness.”11  
By distinguishing consent from forced submission, this revised statutory 
language gestured towards a contextual analysis of the power relations 
within which sexual interactions unfold.  The positive definition of 
consent as a voluntary agreement, as well as limitations on the defense 
of mistaken belief, challenged a version of normative heterosexuality 
founded on feminine acquiescence to seduction, moving Canadian law 
towards an affirmative consent standard. 
R. v. Ewanchuk12 has become the leading authority for trial and 
appellate judges as they attempt to apply these revised statutory 
provisions.  In this important decision, the Supreme Court of Canada 
articulated a standard for sexual consent that approaches “only yes 
rape in Canadian law.  In 1983, Parliament replaced the rape provision with the current three-tier 
structure of gender-neutral sexual assault offenses, criminalizing all forms of non-consensual sexual 
touching and no longer specifically designating an offense defined by penetration.  The existing 
sexual assault provisions distinguish between varying degrees of violence used in commission of the 
crime.  Thus, there is a general sexual assault provision, as well as provisions relating to sexual 
assault with a weapon, threats to a third party and causing bodily harm, and aggravated sexual 
assault.  CC §§ 271(1),  272(1), and  273, respectively. 
 10. CC § 273.1 (3) provides that: 
[n]o consent is obtained, for the purposes of [this section], where (a) the agreement is 
expressed by the words or conduct of a person other than the complainant; (b) the 
complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity; (c) the accused induces the 
complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power or authority; 
(d) the complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage in the 
activity; or (e) the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses, 
by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to continue to engage in the activity. 
Id. 
 11. CC § 273.2 provides that: 
[i]t is not a defence . . . that the accused believed that the complainant consented 
…where  (a) the accused's belief arose from the accused's: (i) self-induced intoxication, 
or (ii) recklessness or wilful blindness; or (b) the accused did not take reasonable steps, 
in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant 
was consenting. 
Id. 
 12. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330. 
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means yes.”13  The Court unanimously found that there is no defense of 
“implied consent” in Canadian law, defining the actus reus of sexual 
assault as non-consensual sexual touching where consent is determined 
from the subjective position of the complainant.14  While insisting that 
intent is a crucial element of the crime of sexual assault, the decision 
emphasized that the defense of mistaken belief is not available when 
tainted by recklessness or willful blindness.15  Moreover, gesturing 
towards the “reasonable steps” requirement, the Court emphasized that 
triers of fact must consider whether the accused took active steps to both 
establish and reestablish consent.16  The Court also embraced a specific 
consent standard, wherein clear agreement to continue to engage in 
sexual contact must be obtained after someone has said no: “[t]he 
accused cannot rely on the mere lapse of time or the complainant’s 
silence or equivocal conduct to indicate that . . . consent now exists, nor 
can he engage in further sexual touching to ‘test the waters.’”17  Finally, 
the Court conceptualized consent as positive consent, arguing that “the 
mens rea of sexual assault is not only satisfied when it is shown that the 
accused knew that the complainant was essentially saying “no,” but is 
also satisfied when it is shown that the accused knew that the 
complainant was essentially not saying “yes.”18  In effect, Ewanchuk 
stands for the proposition that silence and ambiguous conduct do not 
constitute consent and it directs attention to defendants’ actions in 
seeking agreement.19 
Decisions since Ewanchuk have continued to consolidate an 
affirmative consent standard in Canadian law by giving teeth to the 
requirements that consent must be active and can be withdrawn and 
holding that consent-seeking must be comprised of positive steps to 
 13. Rakhi Ruparelia, Does No Mean “No” Mean Reasonable Doubt? Assessing the Impact of 
Ewanchuk on Determinations of Consent, 25 CAN. WOMAN STUD. 167, 167 (2006); Lise Gotell, 
The Discursive Disappearance of Sexualized Violence: Feminist Law Reform, Judicial Resistance 
and Neo-liberal Sexual Citizenship, in REACTION AND RESISTANCE: FEMINISM, LAW AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE 127, 144-46 (Dorothy E. Chunn, Susan B. Boyd & Hester Lessard eds., University of 
British Columbia Press 2007); Renu Mandhane, Efficiency or Autonomy?  Economic and Feminist 
Legal Theory in the Context of Sexual Assault 59 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 173, 188 (2001). 
 14. Ewanchuk, 1 S.C.R. 330 at ¶ 30-31, 34-35. 
 15. Id. at ¶ 42 & 52. 
 16. Id. at ¶ 58, 60.  While the majority did not directly apply § 273.2, the concurring decision 
by L'Heureux-Dubé J. stated that, "unless and until an accused first takes reasonable steps to assure 
that there is consent, the defense of honest but mistaken belief does not arise" Id. at ¶ 99 
(L’Heureux-Dube, concurring). 
 17. Id. at ¶ 52. 
 18. Id. at ¶ 45 (quoting R. v. Park, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 836, ¶ 39 (Can.)). 
 19. Ruparelia, supra note 13, at 171; Gotell, supra note 13; Mandhane, supra note 13. 
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secure agreement.20  Some rulings have emphasized that consent must 
be “freely given” with awareness of the proposed actions and their 
consequences, raising the definition of consent to a standard of 
“informed consent.”21  In a significant decision clarifying the defense of 
mistaken belief, the Manitoba Court of Appeal determined that active 
steps to secure agreement are required when circumstances exist that 
would cause a “reasonable man to inquire further,” raising the mens rea 
standard in Canadian law close to an objective standard.22  Some 
circumstances, such as entering a complainant’s bedroom while she was 
sleeping after a night of drinking or knowing that she was married to a 
close friend, the Court argued, require conversation and verbal consent, 
rather than a mere reliance on physical responses.23  And even in 
situations where complainants are intoxicated, drug affected and/or 
unconscious, Canadian courts are increasingly convicting, finding that 
proceeding with sex in these situations constitutes recklessness or willful 
blindness.24  Clearly, cases involving intoxication continue to be 
contentious as complainants are often unable to provide a complete 
account of what happened.  Yet, in some key decisions, judges have 
 20. For an analysis of reported post-Ewanchuk decisions 1999-2004, see Gotell, supra note 
13, at 146-153. 
 21. R. v. Stender [2005] 1 S.C.R. 914; R. v. R.R., [2001] O.J. No. 4254, ¶ 44 (Ont. C.A. Nov. 
5, 2001). 
 22. R. v. Malcolm, 148 Man. R. (2d) 143, ¶ 21 (Man. C.A. 2000).  It is important to note that 
the “reasonable steps” requirement modified the common law mens rea standard, shifting this 
standard from what had been a purely subjective standard, towards a quasi-objective standard.  
Thus, it is not required that belief in consent be “reasonable” (that is, assessed from the standpoint 
of the reasonable person).  Instead, the accused cannot present a defence that the accused believed 
the complainant consented to the activity if “the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the 
circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting.” 
CC § 273.2(b).  Despite this, some trial and appellate courts have begun to interpret this provision 
as requiring a “reasonable” belief in consent.  Some feminist commentators have been critical of 
this interpretation.  As Lucinda Vandervort has written for example, 
I suggest that adoption of an “objective” standard to assess culpability would invite 
dispositions that reflect community prejudices and practices.  To use the very social 
norms of sexual conduct that result in the commission of sexual offences to determine 
whether an exculpatory defense is available, would, in the vast majority of cases, only 
serve to approve those norms and the conduct based on them.  That approach would 
permit the effective legal norm to be determined by reference to the “ordinary” conduct 
of the “ordinarily” sexually aggressive individual, rather than by a positive standard 
pursuant to the rule of law. 
Lucinda Vandervort, Honest Beliefs, Credible Lies, and Culpable Awareness: Rhetoric, Inequality, 
and Mens Rea, 42 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 625, 659 (2004). 
 23. Malcolm, 148 Man. R. (2d) 143, at ¶ 36; see also R. v. Cornejo, 68 O.R. (3d) 117 (Ont. 
C.A. 2003); R. v. Rodas, [1999] O.J. No. 4503 QUICKLAW (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. Oct. 27, 1999) 
(Rodas). 
 24. R. v. J.A., [2003] O.J. No. 2803, ¶ 127 (Ont. Ct. J. June 24, 2003). 
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relied on indirect evidence (for example that the complainant would not 
have had unprotected intercourse with two men) to find a lack of consent 
against defendants’ claims to the contrary.25  Moreover, in an important 
and recent decision (discussed below), the Alberta Court of Appeal 
found that there is no defense of “prior consent,” because consent must 
be operative at the time sexual contact takes place.26 
Together, legislative provisions and doctrine have moved Canadian 
law firmly in the direction of realizing affirmative consent.  In 
comparative terms, Canada appears to have moved much closer to this 
standard than most other Anglo-American jurisdictions.27  I do not mean 
to suggest that a specific and positive consent standard is by now firmly 
entrenched within Canadian law.  Indeed as Rakhi Ruparelia has 
demonstrated, the Ewanchuk rules have been inconsistently applied by 
trial judges and many sexual assault decisions are infused by myths and 
stereotypes that continue to prevent legal recognition of unwanted sexual 
intrusions.28  In fact, the thrust of this article is to explore the limits of a 
specific and affirmative consent standard and the manner in which 
complainants’ claims continue to be discounted and disqualified.  But in 
order to explore these limits and clarify these mechanisms of 
disqualification, it is necessary to disentangle the meaning of the legal 
embrace of “only yes means yes” in the context of the present. 
III. AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT AND NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY 
What does it mean when legal standards for sexual consent shift 
 25. R. v. J.R., [2006] O.J. No. 2698, ¶ 59 (Ont. Sup. Ct.  J. June 30, 2006).  For a discussion 
of post-Ewanchuk cases involving intoxicated complainants, see Gotell, supra note 13, at 146-47. 
 26. R. v. Ashlee, [2006] A.J. No. 1040 (Alta. C.A. Aug. 23, 2006). 
 27. Reforms in England and Wales have also moved towards affirmative consent, especially 
in modifying the mens rea element of the offense by inserting a reasonableness standard; the 
reasonableness of belief in consent is to be assessed contextually, in light of the surrounding 
circumstances, including the steps taken to ascertain whether the complainant was consenting.  See 
Vanessa. E. Munro, Constructing Consent: Legislating Freedom and Legitimating Constraint in the 
Expression of Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 923 (2008).  Yet there are two reasons why I 
would argue that Canadian law has moved more firmly in the direction of affirmative consent.  
First, in English/Welsh law, new statutory definitions of consent and of mistaken belief relate to 
rape, defined by a penetrative standard.  In Canadian sexual assault law, by contrast, all forms of 
non-consensual sexual touching are criminalized.  Statutory provisions, combined with Ewanchuk 
rules, have established that consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual encounter, requiring the 
affirmative expression of consent and active steps to ensure agreement, when activities shift from 
one form of activity to another.  This comes close to a communicative standard.  Second, reforms in 
England and Wales are in their earliest stage of interpretation.  In Canada, by contrast, doctrine 
surrounding consent has developed and accumulated to the extent that interpretive tests and 
standards have begun to “settle.” 
 28. Ruparelia, supra note 13. 
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from “no means no” to “only yes means yes”?  Is this an indication of 
the successes of feminist legal reform? While recognizing how 
affirmative consent standards are capable of providing enhanced legal 
recognition of women’s sexual autonomy, we must at the same time 
interrogate the legal embrace of “yes means yes” in relation to broader 
shifts in governance and the new privileged forms of citizenship they 
produce. 
To be sure, the elaboration of a positive and explicit consent 
standard in Canadian law means that a concept of sexual autonomy is 
given increased weight and that it is now far less likely that acquiescence 
will be transformed into consent.  What Carol Smart has labelled the 
“pleasurable phallocentric pastime” of pressing a woman until she 
submits is disrupted through emerging legal standards.29  Clear words 
and actions signalling consent are required and judges are placing onus 
on those who initiate sexual contact to secure agreement.  As this occurs, 
the masculine gaze that has long defined the consent/coercion dichotomy 
is surely diluted.  The judicial articulation of an affirmative consent 
standard challenges a dominant (hetero)sexual script built upon forceful 
seduction.30  Yet at the same time, this shift in judicial approaches and 
standards requires careful and critical analysis, using new critical tools.  
In the past, feminist legal theorists have deployed metaphors of 
disqualification and silencing to account for legal responses to sexual 
violation.31  In the current context, we must pay more careful attention 
to the manner in which stories of sexual violation are being both 
produced and heard, and to how, in the long shadow of these legitimized 
stories, constructions of normative heterosexuality are 
formed. 
In one of the first extensive commentaries on the Ewanchuk 
decision, Renu Mandhane considered the standard for consent that the 
decision established using “law and economics” approaches and feminist 
theory.32  Mandhane contends that the Ewanchuk rules can indeed be 
justified through criteria such as economic efficiency; but feminist 
arguments, she insists, are more appropriate as a theoretical justification 
 29. CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 45 (Routledge 1989). 
 30. Joanne Wright, Consent and Sexual Violence in Canadian Public Discourse: Reflections 
on Ewanchuk, 16 CAN. J.  L. & SOC’Y. 173, 184-91 (2001). 
 31. CAROL SMART, Law’s power, the sexed body, feminist discourse, in LAW, CRIME AND 
SEXUALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINISM 83-84 (Sage 1995) (arguing, for example, that “[t]he process of 
the rape trial can be described as a specific mode of sexualization of a woman’s body” with the 
precise and intended effect of disqualifying her testimony and experience of sexual assault). 
 32. Mandhane, supra note 13. 
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 agreement - in situations where they might not 
o 36
 
because they “more adequately account for the paramount interests of 
women in the realm of sexual assault.”33  Mandhane is critical of the 
recent imperialism of the “law and economics” paradigm because of the 
inappropriateness of using economic approaches and con
rstand “non-economic” problems such as sexual coercion. 
What if we consider economic logic, cost and benefit calculations, 
and rules imposed to reduce inefficiencies less as modes of theoretical 
justification for the Ewanchuk consent rules and more as expressions of 
the imperialism of economic rationalities in the context of neoliberal 
governmentality?  Here Mandhane’s analysis becomes both prescient 
and suggestive.  While reiterating compelling feminist critiques of his 
work, in particular its moral neutrality, Mandhane draws on Richard 
Posner to elaborate on how stringent consent standards operate to 
increase the “price” of coercive sex, inducing “individuals” to refrain 
from rape and substitute consensual sex.34  In Mandhane’s view, 
however, Posner’s analysis is incomplete because it fails to consider the 
social costs of rape (its harmful effects for women).35  From a normative 
economic perspective, the Ewanchuk rules are efficient because they 
compel individuals to take into account the negative extern
s) of sexually coercive actions.  As Mandhane writes: 
[T]he consent rules articulated in Ewanchuk represent a Pareto 
improvement in the allocation of sexual conduct.  First, a rule that 
requires positive conduct indicating consent, in order to establish an air 
of reality to the defence of mistake of fact, may make it easier to 
determine whether or not the transaction in question is a product of the 
voluntary agreement of all parties.  Requiring an affirmative indication 
of consent reduces the ambiguity present in sexual encounters.  Indeed, 
some economic theorists have suggested that the whole purpose of 
criminal law is to force people to bargain within the confines of the 
market - which requires
therwise do so . . . .  
When considered through the lens of economics, normalized sexual 
 33. Id. at 227. 
 34. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (Harvard University Press 1993); Mandhane, 
supra note 13, at 192-95.  For feminist critiques of Posner, see Martha A. Fineman, The 
Hermeneutics of Reason: A Commentary on Sex and Reason 25 CONN. L.R. 503 (1993); Robin 
West, Sex, Reason and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO. L.J. 2413 (1993); Gillian K. Hadfield, 
Flirting with Science: Richard Posner on the Bioeconomics of Sexual Man, 106 HARVARD L.R. 479 
(1992); Katherine T. Bartlett, Rumpelstiltskin, 25 CONN. L.R. 473 (1993). 
 35. Mandhane, supra note 13, at 195. 
 36. Id. at 200. 
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become captured by modern techniques of power: governmentality and 
 
interaction becomes understood as being like a market transaction.  
Affirmative consent standards and limitations on the defense of mistaken 
belief operate as inducements for revealing preferences and for ensuring 
that others’ preferences be respected.  Stringent mens rea requirements 
mean that the negative externalities of individual transactions must be 
taken into acco
osexuality. 
Mandhane’s analysis alerts us to the manner in which reformulated 
legal standards for sexual consent might be seen as an active 
reconfiguration of sexual interactions in a manner that infuses normative 
sexuality with an entrepreneurial logic.  It forces us to consider how law, 
in and through criminal legal adjudication, could be seen as expressing 
and enacting a neoliberal rationality of governance.  As described by 
Wendy Brown, neoliberal rationality is not primarily focused on the 
market.37  Instead neoliberal governmentality represents the extension 
and dissemination of market values to all institutions and social action, 
with all dimensions of human life cast in terms of market rationality.38  
Contesting the principles of public provision and rule associated with the 
Keynesian state, neoliberal governmentality interpellates individuals as 
rational and fully responsible entrepreneurial actors.  As Brown 
emphasizes, this strategy of governing does not assume economic 
rationality as ontological.  Instead neoliberal governmentality is a 
constructivist project, a technique of governing, which through policy, 
law, and discourse, seeks to develop and diffuse a market rationality.39  
This governing technology relies on the active production of new forms 
of privileged subjectivity, constructing and forming individuals as 
rational calculating creatures, defined by their capacity for self-ca
ng full responsibility for the consequences of their actions.40 
What would it mean to think about revised consent standards, 
enacted in and through judicial decision-making, in relation to these 
emerging methods of governance and control?  Some scholars 
attempting to construct a more robust Foucaultian analysis of law have 
argued that we must be attentive to how law, including criminal law, has 
 37. WENDY BROWN, Neoliberalism and the end of Liberal Democracy, in EDGEWORKS: 
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 39-40 (Princeton University Press 2005). 
 38. Id. at 40. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 42-43. 
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discipline.41  In this view, law must no longer be viewed primarily as a 
mechanism for preventing harmful transgressions through punishment.  
Instead, law is a site for disposing more efficiently of relationships 
between members of the population.  Law exerts power by engaging in 
the conduct of conduct.  Legal decisions on sexual assault do not simply 
fix the line between rape and normal heterosexuality; these discourses 
prescribe normative heterosexuality, and privileged forms of masculinity 
and femininity.42  Judicial decisions enact a performative repetition of 
normative heterosexuality, shifting and adjusting relations between 
members of the population.  Scholars working in the field of critical 
criminology have elaborated on how new technologies of governance 
rely on responsibilization and risk management as strategies of crime 
control;43 but there has been too little attention to how judicial decisions 
may play a role in the governance of crime “at a distance.”  In this case, 
law at its most “lawlike,” produces idealized subjects who actively 
manage the risk of sexual assault and criminalization.  The new and 
privileged forms of sexual citizenship constructed through the judicial 
elaboration of affirmative consent also create new forms of exclusion 
and disqualification. 
IV. RISK MANAGEMENT AND SEXUAL SUBJECTIVITY 
Anchoring post-Ewanchuk sexual assault decisions are 
reconstructions of good victimhood and idealized masculine sexual 
subjects.  New consent standards, alongside restrictions on sexual 
history evidence, have meant that traditional means of discrediting 
complainants have lost purchase.  When standards for consent are raised 
to “only yes means yes,” consent is understood as an active and ongoing 
process that can be withdrawn at any time.  When responsibility is 
placed on those initiating sex to take steps to ensure agreement, chastity 
and sexual virtue are eroded as the essential prerequisites of good 
victimhood.  Moreover, when masculine sexual behavior is 
reconstructed according to a norm of active consent seeking, the line 
between normative heterosexuality and sexual assault shifts.  
Interrogating these shifting lines demands a careful scrutiny of judicial 
 41. Vanessa E. Munro, Legal Feminism and Foucault – A Critique of the Expulsion of Law 28 
J. L. & SOC’Y. 546 (2001); Victor Tadros, Between Governance and Discipline – The Law and 
Michel Foucault, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 75 (1998). 
 42. Gotell, supra note 13, at 134-35. 
 43. David Garland, Governmentality and the Problem of Crime, 1 THEORETICAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 173 (1997). 
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discourses with attention to the ways in which legal decisions prescribe 
and actively form new sexual subjectivities. 
Animating the judicial elaboration of a positive consent standard is 
an ideal masculine sexual subject constituted through the transactional 
logic of new consent norms.  He is a subject who embraces sexual 
responsibility and assumes the risk of criminalization when he fails to 
take active steps to ensure consent.  He is rational, subjecting his sexual 
actions to the calculus of risk avoidance.  He asks, rather than takes, and 
those who fail to ask are constructed as failed risk managers.  The 
discourse of risk and risk calculation pervades judicial descriptions of 
departures from standards of rational masculine sexual subjectivity: 
The evidence of Rodas was that . . . her response was non-verbal and 
was to the effect that she kept kissing him . . . .non-verbal behaviours, 
when relied upon as expression of consent, must be unequivocal . . . 
avoidance of serious risk-taking  . . . demands that reasonable steps be 
taken, not themselves involving sexually assaultive activity, to clarify 
the limits of any agreement to sexual touching.44 
Someone in [the defendant’s] circumstances takes a serious risk by 
founding an assumption of consent on passivity and non-verbal 
responses as justification for assuming that consent exists.45 
He has spoken about receiving counseling with respect to how to 
recognize and deal with high-risk situations.  He has testified at 
various points that he recognized that the situation he found himself 
in . . . was a high-risk situation.46 
The person who assaults an unconscious woman cannot know whether, 
were she conscious, she would revoke the earlier consent. He therefore 
takes the risk that she may later claim she was assaulted without 
consent.47 
Here risk becomes a mechanism for manipulating sexual behavior and 
for promoting self-regulation.  It is the risk of criminalization, rather 
than insistence on respect for sexual autonomy or recognition of the 
harmful consequence of coerced sex, that functions as the main 
inducement to comply with a specific consent standard.  This point must 
 44. R v. Rodas, [1999] O.J. No. 4503  QUICKLAW, ¶ 89 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Oct. 27, 1999). 
 45. R v. Cornejo, 68 O.R. (3d) 117, ¶ 21 (Ont. C.A. 2003). 
 46. R. v. Patrick, [2002] B.C.J. No. 2261 QUICKLAW, ¶ 19 (B.C. Prov. Ct. Sept. 10, 2002). 
 47. R. v. Ashlee, [2006] A.J. No. 1040, ¶ 28 (Alta. C.A. Aug 23, 2006) (quoting R. v. Esau, 
[1997] 2 S.C.R. 777, ¶ 73 (Can.)). 
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be underlined.  Indeed, as many scholars have noted, despite the clear 
influence of feminist law reformers on the 1992 Criminal Code 
amendments, the application of these provisions appears to have 
proceeded without any significant reliance on feminist principles.  While 
the objectives of promoting sexual equality, reducing the widespread 
problem of sexual violence against women and children, and enhancing 
women’s sexual autonomy were clearly articulated by legislators, rarely 
are these rationales for avoiding sexual assault relied on in the reported 
case law.48 
The active production of a risk-averse rational sexual subject is 
evident in judicial decisions.  In fact, the constructivist and pedagogic 
nature of judicial discourses of affirmative consent becomes strikingly 
explicit at points.  In a decision convicting four young teenage boys for 
repetitively groping the buttocks and breasts of a twelve-year-old girl in 
the hallways of a public school, the deciding judge concludes by 
recommending that the Ewanchuk decision should be “compulsory 
reading” in schools.49  Affirmative consent standards built upon risk and 
responsibility demonstrate the normalizing and disciplinary impetus of 
sexual assault decisions. 
The idealized sexual subjects produced through a judicial pedagogy 
of responsibilization are, of course, gendered.  The liberal legal 
discourse of consent is itself gendered, reinforcing an active masculine 
sexuality and a reactive and passive feminine sexuality and identifying 
the measure of sexual violence as not whether a woman desires sex, but 
instead whether she accedes.50  As Wendy Brown has argued, consent is 
 48. For an analysis of pre-Ewanchuk decisions and the argument that the judicial 
interpretation and application of the consent provisions has excluded feminist and equality 
principles, see John McInnes and Christine Boyle, Judging Sexual Assault Law Against a Standard 
of Equality 29 U.B.C. L. REV. 341 (1995).  For an analysis of post-Ewanchuk decisions, see Gotell, 
supra note 13, at 146-53; Ruparelia, supra note 13, at 168-71. 
 49. R. v. M.A., [2005] O.J. No. 4766 QUICKLAW, ¶ 77 (Ont. Ct. J.). 
 50. Kevin Bonnycastle, Rape Uncodified: Reconsidering Bill C-49 Amendments to Canadian 
Sexual Assault Laws, in LAW AS A GENDERING PRACTICE 60, 73-74 (Dorothy Chunn & Dany 
Lacombe eds., Oxford University Press 2000).  Catherine MacKinnon makes a similar point when 
she writes: 
[W]hen the law of rape finds consent to sex, it does not look to see whether the parties 
were social equals in any sense, nor does it require mutuality or positive choice in sex, 
far less simultaneity of desire.  The doctrine of consent in the law of forcible rape 
envisions instead unilateral initiation (the stereotyped acted/acted-upon model of male-
dominant sex) followed by accession or not by persons tacitly presumed equal. 
Catherine MacKinnon, A Sexual Equality Approach to Sexual Assault, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. 
SCI. 265, 267 (2003) (footnotes omitted). 
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both a sign of subordination and the means of its legitimation.51  Yet as 
discourses of consent become infused with the logic of risk and actively 
disseminate new forms of rational sexual subjectivity, the gendered 
nature of consent is both reinforced and reframed.  The mens rea of 
sexual assault becomes increasingly tied to, and measured by, what a 
“reasonable man” would do in the circumstances.  Likewise, a 
specifically feminine rationality is disseminated, which shifts the 
fulcrum of the dichotomy between a legally valorized victim and an 
unworthy, incredible complainant.  Privileged masculine and feminine 
sexual subjectivities, both measured against a criterion of 
reasonableness, are both responsibilized through a calculus of risk, 
though in distinctly gendered ways. 
Risk as a technology of governing is intrinsically gendered.52  
Critical criminologists such as Pat O’Malley and David Garland argue 
that a central feature of new crime prevention strategies is “self-
discipline;” the promotion of safe-keeping and private prudentialism are 
mechanisms for individualizing and privatizing crime control, shifting 
the problem of crime away from the state and onto would-be victims.53  
As Elizabeth Stanko emphasizes, however, for women, safekeeping is a 
“technology of the soul,” with the appreciation of risk of male violence 
long constitutive of feminine identity.54  While not “new,” women’s fear 
of male violence and the accompanying demands of risk avoidance are 
intensified in the present and constituted as performative of respectable 
femininity.55  As Rachel Hall contends, contemporary rape prevention 
discourses infused with a logic of risk management must be seen as 
revised versions of older understandings about the role of fear in 
women’s lives.56  Rape prevention discourses increasingly treat rape as a 
virtual and ever-present possibility and danger in women’s lives, 
offering agency only through avoidance.  Within a universe of rape 
management constituted in and through discourses of risk, the 
performance of diligent and cautious femininity grants some women 
 51. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 163 
(Princeton University Press 1995). 
 52. Elizabeth Stanko, Safety Talk: Conceptualizing Women’s Safekeeping as a Technology of 
Risk, 1 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 479 (1997); Sandra Walklate, Risk and Criminal 
Victimization: A Modernist Dilemma?, 37 BRIT. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 35 (1997). 
 53. Pat O’Malley, Risk, Power and Crime Prevention, 21 ECON. & SOC’Y 252; Garland, 
supra note 43. 
 54. Stanko, supra note 52. 
 55. Id. at 489. 
 56. Rachel Hall, It Can Happen to You: Rape Prevention in the Age of Risk Management 
19(3) HYPATIA 2, 3 (2004). 
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access to good citizenship, while women who fail to follow the rules of 
safekeeping can be denied recognition.57 
The prudent and responsibilized feminine sexual subject weaves 
through judicial discourses of affirmative consent.  Concepts of risk are 
deployed to construct and demarcate revised boundaries of good and bad 
victimhood.  While the idealized masculine sexual citizen, constituted in 
and through an affirmative consent standard, is he who rationally 
responds to the risks of criminalization through consent seeking, the 
idealized feminine sexual subject is she who actively manages her 
behavior to avoid the ever-present risk of sexual violence.  The new 
“ideal” and valorized victim is a responsible, security conscious, crime-
preventing subject who acts to minimize her own sexual risk.  She is a 
“(re)action hero” with “expert awareness of her own vulnerabilities.”58  
Victim-blaming constructions emerge repeatedly in judicial discourses 
when complainants fail to behave as responsible risk managers: 
Her apparent maturity and intelligence make it puzzling why at 16 
years of age she elected to accompany her friend to C.R.N.’s . . . .  By 
my count there were five young men living at the smallish residence, 
two of whom had their girlfriends staying over.  Almost all, including 
the complainant, were drinking . . . .  Her parents were out of town.  It 
is not unfair, I think to say, putting herself in this setting was of 
questionable judgment, questionable maturity, careless and without 
much concern for her personal security.59 
Her youthful naivety dulled her natural defences.  P.B. got into their 
car firmly believing that they were “cool” guys, going to drive her 
back to the orchard.60 
No doubt, Mr. C., even at the age of 19 years, was naïve in the 
extreme.61 
Here, even as judges convict, complainants are depicted as 
behaving carelessly for failing to recognize the sexual risks inherent in 
perfectly normal social interactions (including, as in the above cases 
respectively, attending a party, accepting a ride from or visiting 
prospective employers).  Failing to display appropriate caution is often 
excused as youthful ignorance, a situational and temporal deviation from 
 57. Id. at 10; Stanko, supra note 52, at 486. 
 58. This is Hall’s concept.  Hall, supra note 56, at 6. 
 59. R. v. C.R.N., [1999] O. J. No. 3918 QUICKLAW, ¶ 14 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). 
 60. R. v. Cheema, [2003] B.C.J. No. 262 QUICKLAW, ¶ 98 (B.C. Prov. Ct. Jan. 30, 2003). 
 61. R. v. Cooper, [2002] O.J. No. 4992, ¶ 50 (Ont. Ct. J. Dec. 6, 2002). 
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the norms of a mature and cautious femininity.  Nonetheless, careless 
disregard for personal safety becomes a site for an altered form of 
victim-blaming, as complainants are constructed as flirting with risk.  In 
a decision (described above) convicting four young teenage boys of 
sexual assault for the repeated sexual touching of a schoolmate, the 
judge engages in overt victim-blaming by arguing that the complainant 
is responsible for letting the situation go unchecked: 
I find that she was a non-assertive 12-year old who to some extent 
showed signs of weakness and unfortunately allowed herself to be 
taken advantage of.  In her own immature mind she hoped that this 
would simply stop and go away . . . .  One gets the sense from [sic] the 
complainant not doing much to stop the grabbing and to continue 
giving hugs to some of the accused is that she was stuck in a situation 
not really knowing how to get out of it and through immaturity, 
innocence, ignorance and fear of not wanting to rock the boat.62 
Not only are good feminine sexual subjects expected to avoid risky 
situations, they are also expected to respond assertively and decisively in 
the face of sexual threats and to seek immediate protection. 
Positioned paradoxically an actively diligent “victim in waiting,” 
the idealized feminine subject produces new axes of victim-blaming and 
also functions as a standard for assessing the credibility of actual 
complainants.  Complainants’ behaviors are explicitly measured against 
the normalized risk-avoiding behaviors of the “reasonable woman.”  The 
Manitoba Court of Appeal’s decision in A. v. A.J.S.63 is illustrative.  The 
thrust of the appeal was that the complainant’s reactions during the 
period in question were unexpected or unusual, thereby rendering her 
testimony unbelievable and the jury conviction unreasonable.  The much 
older defendant was married to the complainant’s sister and the 
complainant alleged that he had repeatedly raped her between 1976 and 
2002.  Her “unusual” behaviors included “voluntarily living with the 
accused”64 and being alone with him in her own basement;65 but the 
appellate bench seemed most puzzled by the fact that the complainant 
had borrowed a lawnmower from a man who had by this point assaulted 
her on many occasions: 
Some of the complainant’s own conduct seems bizarre.  For example, 
in her examination-in-chief, the complainant related how for more than 
 62. R. v. M.A., [2005] O.J. No. 4766 QUICKLAW, ¶ 69-70 (Ont. Ct. J.). 
 63. R. v. A.J.S., [2005] M.J. No. 1 (Man. C.A. Jan. 10, 2005). 
 64. Id. at ¶ 13. 
 65. Id. at ¶ 22. 
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a single summer, she would arrange to borrow the accused’s 
lawnmower in order to cut the grass on her property.  This was not an 
ordinary lawnmower, but one on which the operator could ride, 
intended for large properties.  To obtain the lawnmower meant 
requesting that the accused transport it to the complainant’s house by 
truck on numerous occasions during the spring and summer months.  
On these occasions, the accused allegedly seized the opportunity to 
rape the complainant in her house.  On some occasions, the 
complainant made sure that one of her sons was present when the 
lawnmower was delivered and/or when the accused returned to reclaim 
it.  On other occasions, when no one was around, as noted earlier, she 
tried to lock herself in the house, or, if he gained entry, then in the 
bathroom, to escape his unwanted advances.  Her testimony begs the 
question raised on cross-examination: Why would she put herself at 
risk of being raped for the sole reason of borrowing a lawnmower to 
cut the grass?66 
The Court’s characterization of the complainant’s actions as 
bizarre, unexpected and unusual rests on a decontextualized view of risk 
avoidance, ignoring how a woman living in poverty, in a remote 
northern community, might need to continue to interact with a sexually 
abusive man.  In this decision, the Court of Appeal ultimately finds that 
the jury verdict was not unreasonable and that the defense of mistaken 
belief lacked an “air of reality,” principally on the basis that the accused 
had not testified.67  Nonetheless, the Court’s explicit emphasis on how 
credibility is undermined by “abnormal” risk-taking behaviors operates 
as a powerful demonstration of transformed contours of the ideal 
victimhood and the ties between risk-taking and incredibility. 
As Wendy Larcombe emphasizes, the line between the ideal victim 
and incredible complainant is neither fixed nor eternal.68  As she too has 
argued, the discursively produced ideal victim is no longer defined 
exclusively nor primarily by traditional qualities of sexual morality and 
chastity.  Instead, consistency, rationality, and risk-avoidance constitute 
new markers of normative conduct against which the behaviors and 
credibility of actual complainants are measured and assessed.69  Within 
recent Canadian sexual assault decisions, good sexual citizens are 
reconfigured as being like rational economic actors, assuming 
 66. Id. at ¶ 17. 
 67. Id. at ¶ 39. 
 68. Wendy Larcombe, The 'Ideal' Victim V Successful Rape Complainants: Not What You 
Might Expect 10 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 131 (2002). 
 69. Id. at 145. 
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responsibility for their actions and the risks that they take.  Under the 
standard of explicit consent, what is bad and untrustworthy is being 
redefined.  As normalized sexual subjects are increasingly reconfigured 
through concepts of responsibility and risk, so too is the untrustworthy 
complainant reconstituted.  The inverse opposite of the rape-preventing 
subject is the risky woman, the woman who avoids personal 
responsibility for sexual safety, the woman who places herself within 
and occupies a space of risk.  The risky woman slides into the traditional 
place of the promiscuous woman under new logics of consent. 
V. RISKY WOMEN AS OTHER AND OUTSIDE THE TRANSACTIONAL 
SEXUAL ECONOMY 
In R. v. M.S.,70 R. v. Ashlee71 and R. v. Edmondson,72 the 
complainants share marginalized social locations that render them highly 
vulnerable to sexual violence.  The complainants in both M.S. and 
Ashlee are drug-addicted and living on the streets, while the twelve-year 
old complainant in Edmondson is an aboriginal girl who is running away 
from home.  Systemic relations of race, class, and gender, silenced in 
judicial discourses of positive consent, interact to construct some 
women’s bodies as violable.  The Native Women’s Association of 
Canada (NWAC) estimates that hundreds of aboriginal women and girls 
have gone missing in the last 20 years in circumstances involving 
violence.73  While there has been no systematic study of sexual violence 
endured by aboriginal women, statistical research on reported sexual 
assaults suggests that aboriginal women face rates that are many times 
higher than other Canadian women.74  Sherene Razack highlights the 
centrality of sexual violence in ongoing relations of colonization.75  As 
she has argued, colonization has marked the social geography of 
Western Canada, creating boundaries between white middle class 
spaces, ruled by norms of universal justice, and the racialized spaces of 
 70. [2003] A.J. No. 1516, (Alta. Prov. Ct. Nov. 27, 2003). 
 71. 391 A.R. 62 (ABCA 2006). 
 72. 257 Sask. R. 270 (Sask. C.A. 2005). 
 73. Amnesty International (Canada), Stolen Sisters: A Human Rights Response to 
Discrimination and Violence Against Aboriginal Women in Canada (Ottawa: Amnesty International 
Canada, 2004) at 24. 
 74. Holly Johnson, Measuring Violence Against Women: Statistical Trends STATISTICS 
CANADA CATALOGUE NO. 85-570-XIE, 64-69 (2006), available at 
http://www.statcan.ca/english/research/85-570-XIE/85-570-XIE2006001.pdf. 
 75. Sherene H. Razack, Gendered Racial Violence and Spatialized Justice: The Murder of 
Pamela George, 15 CAN. J.  L. & SOC’Y. 91 (2000). 
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the inner city and reserve, constructed as zones of violence.  In her 
brilliant analysis of the trial of two white university students accused of 
sexually assaulting and murdering an aboriginal woman, Razack 
demonstrates how “bodies in degenerate spaces lose their entitlement to 
personhood through a complex process in which the violence that is 
enacted is naturalized.”76  Through such spatial divisions and as an 
effect of colonial relations, aboriginal women and girls become 
legitimate targets of violence, particularly violence enacted b
 
Homeless and addicted women living in what Razack has described 
as the “degenerate spaces” where violence is normalized occupy social 
positions that are analogous to aboriginal women.  Marked increases in 
homeless populations on the streets of Calgary and Edmonton are 
classed effects of the booming Alberta oil economy, accompanying 
housing shortages and the evisceration of social entitlements enacted by 
neoliberal provincial governments since the 1990s.77  Homeless women 
experience extremely high rates of sexual violence and research suggests 
that familial abuse and sexual violence are major factors contributing to 
the homelessness of young women.78  Many people living on the streets 
of Alberta’s cities are of aboriginal descent.79  That the decisions in 
Ashlee and M.S. do not identify the complainants as aboriginal does not 
mean that they are not; in the decontextualized discursive economy of 
judicial de
ified. 
When filtered through norms of risk-management and sexual 
safekeeping, however, the gendered, racialized and classed power 
relations producing and constructing vulnerabilities disappear.  In and 
 76. Id. at 129. 
 77. DIANA GIBSON, TAMING THE TEMPEST: AN ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR 
ALBERTA iv (Parkland Institute 2007). 
 78. Suzanne L. Wenzel et al., Toward a More Comprehensive Understanding of Violence 
Against Impoverished Women, 21 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 820, 829 (2006); RUSTY NEAL, 
VOICES: WOMEN, POVERTY AND HOMELESSNESS IN CANADA, 10 (National Anti-Poverty 
Organization 2004); MICHAEL SHAPCOTT, WELLESLEY INSTITUTE BACKGROUNDER: PHYSICAL AND 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE RATES FOR HOMELESS MANY TIMES HIGHER THAN HOUSED (Wellesley 
Institute 2007), available at http://wellesleyinstitute.com/files/violence_backgrounder.pdf. 
 79. The most recent counts of homeless populations in Edmonton and Calgary found that 38% 
of all homeless people in Edmonton are aboriginal and that 38% of homeless women in Calgary are 
aboriginal: EDMONTON JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE ON HOUSING, OUT IN THE COLD: A COUNT OF 
HOMELESS PERSONS IN EDMONTON 5 (Edmonton Joint Planning Committee on Housing 2006); 
CITY OF CALGARY, COMMUNITY AND NEIGHBORHOOD SERVICES POLICY AND PLANNING DIVISION. 
RESULTS OF THE 2006 COUNT OF HOMELESS PERSONS IN CALGARY 17 (City of Calgary 2006).  The 
Edmonton count did not calculate the racial composition of the homeless women population. 
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through the responsibilized logic of neoliberal discourse, vulnerability is 
reconstructed as an individual problem and an effect of risk-taking.  Just 
as neoliberal discourse pathologizes welfare recipients and constructs the 
poor as individually blameworthy for their poverty, so too is the violence 
enacted on the bodies of vulnerable women personalized and 
individualized.80  The discourse of “high risk lifestyle” has framed 
criminal justice and investigatory responses to missing and murdered 
women in Western Canada.81  Echoing, yet hyperbolizing the safety 
pedagogies described by Stanko and Hall,82 the rapes, murders, and 
disappearances of women in the sex trade and aboriginal women and 
girls are framed as problems to be addressed through strategies of risk 
avoidance and self-management.  Women are counseled to avoid taking 
risky actions and placing themselves vulnerable situations; and 
extremely marginalized women who are victimized become defined by 
and reduced to their “high risk lifestyles.”  A Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP) website providing a list of “safety tips” for women “at 
risk,” emphasizes that the “most important tip is not to be involved in a 
high risk profession, lifestyle or activity such as prostitution or 
hitchhiking.”83  “These activities,” accord
 vulnerable to becoming a victim.”84 
What happens in law when complainants behave in ways that can 
be viewed as exemplifying defiant disregard for their own sexual safety?  
As described above, judges often characterize risk-taking behaviors as 
temporary departures from the norms of responsibilized feminine sexual 
subjectivity.  Yet there is a distinction between this state of temporary 
deviation and women and girls who by their “high risk lifestyles” can be 
seen as literally occupying spaces of risk.  An examination of the 
decisions in M.S., Edmondson, and Ashlee reveals how risky behaviors, 
especially when risk becomes inscribed on the very identities of 
 80. See Janet Mosher, Welfare Reform and the Re-Making of the Model Citizen, in POVERTY: 
RIGHTS, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP, LEGAL ACTIVISM 119 (Margot Young et al., eds., UBC Press 2007) 
for a discussion of the pathologization of welfare dependency.  I am making an analogous argument. 
 81. The mandate of Project Kare, a Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) taskforce 
investigating more than 80 cases of missing and murdered women in Alberta, is as follows: “The 
‘Project KARE’ Task Force will pursue strategies to minimize the risk of having additional HIGH 
RISK MISSING PERSONS (HRMP) murdered within the Provincial Capital Region.  Furthermore, 
investigational strategies have been developed to investigate all leads, capture and prosecute the 
offender(s) responsible for these murders.”  RCMP, PROJECT KARE, Project Mandate, (emphasis in 
original), available at http://www.kare.ca/content/view/8/19/ (last visited January 27, 2008). 
 82. Stanko, supra note 52; Hall, supra note 56. 
 83. RCMP, PROJECT KARE, Safety Tips, available at http://www.kare.ca/content/view/14/24/. 
 84. Id. 
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hat this constellation of 
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complainants, can result in legal disqualification.  In cases where sexual 
assault complainants are intoxicated, hitchhiking runaways, or drug-
addicted women living on the street, riskiness becomes perpetual and 
ever-present.  I do not mean to suggest that the claims of such risky 
women or girls are routinely discounted.  Indeed, the outcomes in these 
cases are distinct.  Yet, when read together, they demonstrate how 
riskiness becomes tied to incredibility under norms of risk-avoidance 
and rational sexual behavior.  Moreover, when complainants’ behaviors 
appear as irrational under norms of risk avoidance, the legal standards of 
affirmative and explicit consent can be weakened or even disregarded.  
As I have argued, the application of new consent standards involves the 
“objective” measuring of defendants’ actions against the idealized 
behaviors of the responsibilized masculine subject (he who takes steps to 
ensure consent).  When complainant actions are constituted as risky and 
irrational, however, deviations from the standard of responsibi
uline sexuality can be, and often are, excused and normalized. 
 In M.S., the alleged assault occurred after the complainant had 
gone to an inner city park with a man she had met only that day and after 
she blacked out from consuming painkillers and alcohol.85  By her 
testimony, when A.R. awoke, she was being brutally sexually attacked 
by the defendant: “she was screaming and that the more she screamed, 
the more she got hurt.”86  The complainant claimed that the defendant 
forced his penis into her vagina, anus and mouth and that he had beaten 
her and dragged her across the grass when she tried to run away.87  A 
passerby heard the complainant say, “with some desperation,” three 
separate times, “can you help me, I’m being raped.”88  This witness 
found the accused on top of the A.R. having sexual intercourse.89  He 
loudly ordered the accused to “get off her” and waited “approximately 
thirty seconds” for him to comply.90  The doctor who performed the 
sexual assault exam testified that the complainant had several scratches 
and scrapes, vaginal and anal tearing and t
ies “was consistent with sexual assault.”91 
How it is possible that A.R.’s strongly corroborated allegation of 
having been violently sexually assaulted was discounted and the accused 
 85. R. v. M.S., [2003] A.J.No. 1516, ¶ 4 (Alta. Prov. Ct. Nov. 27, 2003). 
 86. Id. at ¶ 5. 
 87. Id. at ¶ 6-8 (complainant’s testimony). 
 88. Id. at ¶ 20. 
 89. Id. at 20-21. 
 90. Id. at ¶ 22; but see id. at ¶ 21. 
 91. Id. at ¶ 28.  Doctor’s testimony is described at ¶ 26-28. 
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acquitted?  Sexual assaults most often occur in private without direct 
witnesses, and convictions are entered based upon the uncorroborated 
evidence of complainants.  In this respect, M.S. is an unusual case.  On 
the strength of witness testimony and medical evidence, it would seem 
that a conviction in this case should have been likely.  As I have shown, 
the affirmative consent standards established in Ewanchuk require 
active, ongoing consent, and when a complainant says “no,” the accused 
is required to take steps to reestablish willingness to continue.  In this 
case, A.R. was heard calling for help three times and there was 
testimony that even after being confronted by the passer-by, the accused 
stayed on top of her for at least thirty seconds.92  It would appear that he 
took no steps to ensure or reestablish consent.  This is a decision in 
which the “reasonable steps” requirement is actively ignored and in 
which the complainant’s repeated sexual refusals are silenced because of
ultiple departures from the idealized norms of sexual safekeeping. 
Intoxication marks a critical deviation from the rationalized and 
responsibilized norms of the explicit consent standard.  Intoxicated 
complainants can be constructed as defying standards of sexual 
safekeeping by placing themselves at risk;93 they also frequently do not 
remember their sexual assaults, thereby undermining the credibility of 
their claims.  Yet, as I have argued above, the consolidation of a positive 
and specific consent standard has meant that Canadian courts are 
increasingly convicting in such cases, finding that to proceed with sex in 
circumstances where complainants are very intoxicated or passed out, 
without active steps to ensure unequivocal consent, constitutes 
recklessness and wilful blindness.94  In addition, in cases where 
complainants are rendered silent as witnesses through their lack of 
memory, some judges have relied on indirect evidence to find non-
consent.  In R. v. J.R.,95 the complainant, like A.R., was drunk and had 
taken drugs, causing her to black out.  The deciding judge found that she 
 92. Id. at ¶ 21; but see id. at ¶ 56-57. 
 93. Vanessa E. Munro and Emily Finch have demonstrated through mock jury studies how 
third party observers often hold intoxicated complainants at least partially responsible for their 
victimization.  As they found, “the tendency to focus on the complainant’s behaviour and to 
attribute responsibility accordingly was more tenacious than had been anticipated, remaining 
constant even in situations in which the defendant spiked the complainant’s drink with alcohol.”  
Vanessa E. Munro & Emily Finch, The Demon Drink and the Demonized Woman: Socio-sexual 
Stereotypes and Responsibility Attribution in Rape Trials Involving Intoxicants, 16 SOC. & L. STUD. 
592, 607 (2007). 
 94. Gotell, supra note 13, at 146-47.  See, e.g., R. v. J.A., [2003] O.J. No. 2803, ¶ 128 (Ont. 
Ct. J. June 24, 2003); R. v. Cornejo, 68 O.R. (3d) 117, ¶ 18-19 (Ont. C.A. 2003). 
 95. [2006] O.J. No. 2698, ¶ 59 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. June 20, 2006). 
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ged based upon an implicit standard of reasonable 
sexu
ce mapped as being outside of the 
trans
 
had not consented by drawing inferences from her usual sexual 
behaviors and by her claims that she would not have had unprotected sex 
with two men, shortly after an abortion, and after being warned by her 
doctor to abstain from sexual intercourse.96  In decisions like J.R., 
intoxication is treated as a temporary deviation from a rational norm, just 
as consent is jud
al behaviors. 
In M.S., however, the complainant’s intoxication is transformed 
from a temporary deviation into a state of being, cemented by the 
decision’s repeated references to A.R. having several beers outside on 
the day of the attack and to her addiction to painkillers.  In this way, the 
risky behaviors of drinking and drug use slide into the permanent 
markers of a “high risk lifestyle.”  A.R.’s intoxication at the time of the 
assault becomes firmly located in a pathological discourse; she is framed 
as a drunken transient, incapable of responsible neo-liberal citizenship or 
self-management.  She is represented by the defense as untrustworthy on 
this basis and her frequent claims that she does not remember are 
transformed into lies.97  In turn, A.R.’s addiction combines with her 
homelessness to remove any necessity of assessing consent based upon 
what she would not normally do.  The decision makes reference to 
testimony by A.R.’s common law husband that they had sexual 
intercourse twice outside on the day of the attack.98  Having sex in a 
park might be viewed, in other circumstances, as indicating a departure 
from what a reasonable woman might do, perhaps providing indirect 
evidence of non-consent.  Here, however, sex outside, sex that is risky, 
sex that defies standards of responsibility, respectability and sexual 
safekeeping, marks the complainant herself as a deviant.  While she is 
assaulted in an inner city park, the dominant image in the judge’s 
recounting is of having sex “in the bushes,” a phrase that is repeated 
twelve times in the decision.  This repetition consolidates A.R.’s 
association with a space of degeneracy and wildness, a space where 
normal rules do not apply, a spa
actional norms of responsibilized sexual citizenship. 
While the transactional requirements of affirmative consent are 
displaced in this decision, an economic framework is nonetheless 
maintained, giving credence to an alternate account that, in the judge’s 
 96. Id. at ¶ 38. 
 97. In recounting her testimony and cross-examination, the decision frequently refers to the 
complainant’s inability to remember as “lying.”  R. v. M.S., [2003] A.J.No. 1516, ¶ 13-15.. 
 98. Id. at ¶ 18. 
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ormed into a story of a sexual bargain 
gon
 would allege “rape” unless he gave her the 
p 99




assessment, raises reasonable doubt.  A well-corroborated claim of 
violent sexual assault is transf
e wrong through extortion: 
[t]he defence says that the complainant actively and expressly 
consented to sexual intercourse as part of a bargain to secure a leather 
jacket. The defence also argues that the complainant undertook to 
change the terms of that bargain during the act of sexual intercourse by 
requesting an additional piece of property from the accused, failing 
which the complainant would maintain that she had been “raped”. [sic]  
In other words, the defence does not argue consent by virtue of silence, 
passivity, or ambiguous conduct rather, the defence argues that the 
complainant actively consented to sexual intercourse and then 
endeavoured to secure additional items of property from the accused 
by suggesting that she
roperty in question.  
A transactional conception of normative heterosexuality, as I have 
suggested, is built upon the rationality of actors in a sexual marketplace.  
What happens, then, if participants in a sexual transaction defy the rules 
of the market by altering the terms of the bargain, by reneging on a 
sexual agreement?  In this case, the claim of extortion becomes both a 
plausible alternative explanation and also a justification for refusing to 
apply the legal standard of affirmative and explicit consent.  Must a 
responsible man still be required to ensure consent when the other 
participa
s? 
Even if the defendant’s account is taken as a true description of 
events, the Ewanchuk consent rules clearly require that he have taken 
steps to reestablish agreement. Rather than evaluating what steps, if any, 
the accused took, the decision highlights his claim that he did not force 
A.R. to engage in sexual intercourse100 and witness testimony that the 
defendant had gotten off A.R. when asked.101  This represents a 
complete denial of the Ewanchuk standards, focusing on force, rather 
than on the existence of affirmative consent, and erasing the requirement 
that consent must be determined from the subjective position of the 
complainant, not a passerby.  In this displacement of the positive and 
explicit consent rules, the complainant’s subjectivity is erased.  And by 
giving credence to the defendant’s story of extortion, A.R. bec
 99. Id. at ¶ 47. 
 100. Id. at ¶ 36. 
 101. Id. at ¶ 21. 
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 testimony of one of the other men involved in the 
occu
 
rstood as a threat to the responsible masculine sexual subject. 
In Edmondson,102 a high profile Saskatchewan case, a similar form 
of disqualification and victim-blaming occurs.  In the legal narrative of 
this case, the young complainant’s actions and behavior are also 
constituted as risky, “irrational,” and outside the logic of a rational 
sexual economy.  While the accused was convicted in a jury trial, the 
complainant’s “unpredictability” was used as a mitigating factor in 
sentencing.  Both the conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal, 
though the charge was reduced from being a party to the offense of 
sexual assault with two other men, contrary to the “gan
isions of the Criminal Code,103 to simple sexual assault.104 
The twelve-year-old Yellow Quill First Nation girl was running 
away from home.105  At the time that she was assaulted, she was less 
than five feet tall and weighed eighty-seven pounds.106  It is possible that 
she was running away because her father had sexually abused her.  She 
was sitting on the steps of a small town bar.  She accepted a ride from 
three white men who were leaving the bar.  She supplied them with a 
false name and told them she was fourteen and from Saskatoon.  None of 
the men inquired any further about her age.  She accepted their offer of 
beer, drinking four in less than thirty minutes, leaving her so intoxicated 
that she could not stand up.  She claimed that she then passed out.  The 
men drove her to an isolated area.  Edmondson tried to have intercourse 
with her on the hood of the truck.  He continued to hold her while the 
two other men attempted intercourse.  According to Rosalind Prober, 
“[t]he victim’s story never changed during countless police and crown 
attorney interviews, at the preliminary hearing and two trials, in media 
interviews, to doctors and to her parents and friends.”107  As in M.S., her 
claim was also corroborated.  As the Court of Appeal found, “the 
complainant’s testimony found confirmation in the accused’s statement 
to police, and in the
rrence . . . .”108 
How is it possible that such a vicious act of sexual assault against a 
vulnerable child could result in a conditional sentence of only two years 
 102. 257 Sask. R. 270 (Sask. C.A. 2005). 
 103. CC § 272(1)(d). 
 104. Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270, at ¶ 109. 
 105. Id. at ¶ 54. 
 106. Rosalind Prober, What No Child Should Endure: R. v. Edmondson, Kindrat and Brown, 3 
BEYOND BORDERS NEWSLETTER 1 (Beyond Borders Inc., Winnipeg, MB, 2003) Fall 2003, at 1. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270 at ¶ 48. 
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nters the legal process in ways that 
sanc
ational and 
“unpredictable” element in a transactional sexual economy. 
 
to be served in the community?  How is it possible that culpability was 
shifted from the accused to the complainant through a judicial narrative 
framing her as the “sexual aggressor”?  This case has been held up as an 
egregious example of racism within the Canadian legal system.109  The 
trial judge’s remarks during trial, the inadequate sentence, and the Court 
of Appeal decision have all been condemned by Canadian aboriginal 
organizations.110  NWAC intervened on appeal to underscore the 
importance of sentences that would denounce the sexual violation of 
aboriginal girls in a context of pervasive and systemic gendered, 
racialized violence.111  Edmondson can be understood as exemplifying 
Razack’s argument that the violation of aboriginal women and girls is an 
ongoing repetition of the colonial encounter that is sanctioned by law.112  
Drawing on Razack, Nicholas Bonokoski has argued that the 
complainant was “criminalized . . . using all possible colonial 
constructions to frame her as a sexual threat to Dead [sic] Edmondson, 
the normative white male colonial subject.”113  As he demonstrates, the 
complainant in this case becomes located in a space beyond law, marked 
as a “squaw,” and her life only e
tion the violence done to her. 
It is clear that racist and sexualized discourses are mobilized in 
Edmondson to erase the complainant’s vulnerability and to excuse the 
predatory behavior of the accused.  Yet, we must also be attentive to 
how and under what terms these processes of disqualification occur.  
Under the contractual logic of affirmative consent, colonial 
constructions are both mobilized and reconfigured.  In this case, as in 
M.S., the complainant’s conduct places her outside normative standards 
of feminine diligence and sexual caution.  And, as with the complainant 
in M.S., riskiness is not simply signified by her conduct; it becomes 
inscribed upon her identity.  She becomes an irr
 109. Norma Buydens, The “Melfort” Rape and Children’s Rights: Why R. v. Edmondson 
Matters to All Canadian Kids, 4 SASKATCHEWAN NOTES 1 (Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, Regina SK 2005); Nicholas Bonokoski, Colonial Constructs and Legally Sanctioned 
Sexually violence Consequences in R. V Edmondson, 7 RECONSTRUCTION: STUDIES IN 
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE, available at http://reconstruction.eserver.org/071/bonokoski.shtml. 
 110. Darren Bernhardt, Not Guilty Verdict in Rape Trial Stirs Protests, CANWEST NEWS 
SERVICE, March 21, 2007, available at 
http://www.canada.com/topics/news/story.html?id=e93d8ab5-84b3-4bcc-9f78-b2907541755d. 
 111. Native Women’s Association of Canada, Factum of the Intervenor, R. v. Edmondson, 
(2005) [hereinafter NWAC] (copy on file with author). 
 112. Razack, supra note 75. 
 113. Bonokoski, supra note 109, at ¶ 15. 
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As I have emphasized, discourses of risk-taking and “living a high-
risk lifestyle” function to reconstruct vulnerability as an individual 
failing and an effect of risk taking.  This reconstruction marks the 
judicial narrative in Edmondson, emerging most clearly in the trial 
judge’s sentencing report in which the complainant is firmly depicted as 
being responsible for her own violation.  As NWAC argued in its 
intervention at the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, the jury’s verdict in 
this case rested on one of three alternate findings of fact with respect to 
consent: that “the complainant was incapable of giving consent because 
she was 12 years old, and Edmondson had not taken all reasonable steps 
to ascertain her age”;114 that she “was incapable of giving consent 
because she was too intoxicated”;115 or that “the complainant simply did 
not consent.”116 Yet, Judge Kovatch seemed to base his sentence on the 
first scenario, proceeding on the basis of “the possibility of willing 
participation by [the] complainant . . . in the context of a situation where 
a complainant cannot legally consent due to his or her age.”117  In his 
sentencing report, the trial judge drew attention to the fact that she had 
lied about her age and had “deliberately” tried to appear older than she 
actually was.118  He highlighted the fact that she had voluntarily chosen 
to drink and that she had previously consumed alcohol.119  In this 
manner, attention is deflected away from the fact that the adult defendant 
had provided her with so much alcohol that she could not stand up.  In 
the same way that the complainant in M.S. is identified as a “drunken 
transient,” the racist myth of the “drunken Indian” is here mobilized to 
locate the complainant in a space of degeneracy and to consolidate a 
victim-blaming narrative.120  That she had experience drinking marks 
her as deviant and not like other twelve-year old gir
 114. In Canadian law, there is a three tier-age and capacity based regime for the control of sex 
offenses against children focused on sexual exploitation and capacity to consent.  Children under 12 
are a prohibited category, based on empirical evidence that young children cannot evaluate the 
dimensions of consent to sexual activity and are particularly vulnerable to adult control.  A partial 
prohibition exists for children between 12 and 14 who can consent to sexual activity with a person 
within two years of their age, if both are over 12.  Children between 14 and 16 cannot consent to 
sexual activity with anyone in a position of trust or authority over them, but after age 16 children 
can freely consent.  CC §§ 150-153; Jeremy Patrick, Sexual Exploitation and the Criminal Code 43 
ALTA. L. REV. 1057 (2006). 
 115. See Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270, at ¶ 90. 
 116. NWAC, supra note 111, at ¶ 8. 
 117. Id. at ¶ 9. (quoting Transcript of Sentencing Report). 
 118. R. v. Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270, ¶ 54 (Sask. C.A. 2005) (quoting the sentencing 
report). 
 119. NWAC, supra note 111, at ¶ 10 (quoting Transcript of Sentencing Report). 
 120. In a study of 67 cases in which aboriginal women were sexual assaulted, Margo 
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It is clear from the evidence that the complainant was left extremely 
intoxicated, slipping in and out of consciousness.  Her lack of conscious 
memory about what happened preceding the sexual assault, as Norma 
Buydens suggests, is consistent with a memory black-out.121  Under an 
affirmative consent standard, extreme intoxication has led to judicial 
findings that to proceed with sex when one is not sure if the complainant 
knew what she was doing constitutes recklessness or willful 
blindness.122  Yet, this young girl’s status as a runaway and an 
experienced drinker are used to shift attention away from her state of 
vulnerability.  She is blamed for her own intoxication; drinking is 
framed as being part of her normal behavior, rather than simply a risky 
and temporary deviation.  And in Judge Kovatch’s sentencing report, the 
complainant’s lack of memory becomes a blank space through which, 
using the testimony of the accused, the complainant comes to be 
understood as a willing participa
Emphasizing the complainant’s complicity, the sentencing report 
called attention to evidence suggesting that she had entered the 
defendant’s truck “willingly,” that she had shown no signs of concern at 
the bar prior to the assault and that there was no suggestion that she had 
been restrained or held against her will.123  In the most contentious part 
of this report, Judge Kovatch explicitly framed the complainant as “the 
aggressor.”124  How is it possible to construct an intoxicated twelve-year 
old girl as the sexual aggressor in an encounter with three adult men on 
an isolated rural side road?  At trial, the defense had presented evidence 
to allege that the complainant was being sexually abused by her father 
and that he had vaginal intercourse with her on the day of the attack.125  
The defense had called a local pediatrician as an expert witness who 
testified that sexually abused children could behave in “sexually 
unpredictable” ways.126  In his sentencing report, Judge Kovatch 
Nightingale demonstrated the ongoing influence of the racist stereotype of the “drunken Indian,” 
both on case outcomes and on sentencing.  Margo Nightingale, Judicial Attitudes and Differential 
Treatment: Native Women in Sexual Assault Cases, 23 OTTAWA L. REV. 71, 87-90.  As she shows, 
for aboriginal women who are raped, intoxication becomes a form of victim-blaming.  Id.  
Moreover, aboriginal women who are assaulted when passed out are often considered by judges to 
have suffered less of a violation.  Id.; see also Sherene H. Razack, “What is to be Gained by 
Looking White People in the Eye? Culture, Race and Gender in Cases of Sexual Assault, 19 SIGNS 
894, 901 (1994). 
 121. Buydens, supra note 109, at 2. 
 122. R. v. J.A., [2003] O.J. No. 2803, ¶ 128 (Ont. Ct. J. June 24, 2003). 
 123. NWAC, supra note 111, at ¶ 12 (quoting Transcript of Sentencing Report). 
 124. Id. at ¶ 12. 
 125. See R. v. Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270, ¶ 47 (Sask. C.A. 2005). 
 126. Id. at ¶ 56. 
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characterized this testimony as “very troublesome” and framed it as 
support for Edmondson’s position that the complainant “was not only a 
willing participant, but indeed, the aggressor.”127  As he insisted, “there 
is certainly a doubt in my mind. . . as a result of that evidence,” and that 
this fact, “should, in fairness, be taken into account for sentencing 
purposes.”128 
As NWAC strongly argued in its intervention on appeal, to reduce 
the culpability of offenders who assault abused children on the basis that 
many act out is “tantamount to making the Court complicit in the repeat 
abuse of children” and is especially worrying “because of the prevalence 
of sexual abuse against Aboriginal children.”129  As Bonokoski 
contends, the portrayal of this young complainant as the sexual 
aggressor reinforces the racist construction of aboriginal women and 
girls as promiscuous, sexually available, and unrapeable.130  This 
framing also responsibilizes the complainant, revealing how, under the 
logics of contractual consent, vulnerabilities are erased and victim-
blaming constructions are mobilized.  In this case, the complainant’s 
risky behaviors (her drinking, her “lying,” her “hitchhiking”) are 
transformed into complicity.  Her past sexual victimization results in her 
pathologization and sexual unpredictability becomes inscribed upon her 
identity.  Her victimization is erased in a judicial narrative that reframes 
her as a sexual threat. 
“Sexual unpredictability” operates here in much the same way that 
“sexual extortion” functions in M.S.  Sexual unpredictability becomes a 
justification for deviations from the consent-seeking standards of 
normative masculinity.  It is as if the sexual subject positions, produced 
through the transactional logics of affirmative consent, exist in a relation 
of necessary complimentary.  The “unpredictable” behaviors of a young 
girl who accepts a ride, drinks beer, and acts in ways that so exceeds the 
norms of sexual safekeeping results in a corresponding relaxation of the 
requirements of active consent seeking.  The complainant becomes, in 
effect, a risky woman by virtue of the risk she poses to the masculine 
sexual subject. 
 The defendant, by contrast, is represented as posing no risk at all.  
His sexual aggression is constructed as an “isolated criminal act, fuelled 
in very significant part by excessive alcohol consumption all round.”131  
 127. NWAC, supra note 111, at ¶ 12 (quoting Transcript of Sentencing Report). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at ¶ 63. 
 130. Bonokoski, supra note 109, at ¶ 19, 21. 
 131. R. v. Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270, ¶ 114 (Sask. C.A. 2005) (noting Judge Kovatch’s 
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While drinking operates to undermine the complainant’s credibility and 
to consign her to a space of degeneracy, alcohol abuse becomes an 
excuse for the defendant’s bad behavior.132  According to the Court of 
Appeal, Judge Kovatch characterized the defendant as “a first time 
offender,” “gainfully employed, with a very supportive family.”133  The 
defendant’s deviations from the responsibilized norms of masculine 
sexual subjectivity are represented as temporary and inconsistent with 
his overall adherence to the requirements of neoliberal citizenship.  He is 
depicted as a white citizen subject, tied to his family and to the 
community.  In Judge Kovatch’s assessment, serving a community-
based sentence would not, therefore, “endanger the safety of the 
community.”134  This portrayal of the defendant as “risk-free” 
necessarily depends upon on a colonial construction of “community” 
that excludes aboriginal women and girls and that views them as the 
source of the violence that is inflicted upon them.135 
A separation is enacted between this exclusionary community and 
those gendered, classed, and racialized bodies occupying spaces of risk.  
In the judicial narratives woven in M.S. and in Edmondson, 
responsibilization takes a highly accentuated form, not only blaming 
vulnerable women and girls for the risks that they take, but also 
reconstructing these risky subjects as sexual threats.  In this process, as I 
have argued, these complainants are placed outside the logic of the 
transactional sexual economy, their subjectivity is siphoned, and 
deviations from the active consent-seeking requirements of affirmative 
consent are legitimized and excused.  The Alberta Court of Appeal 
decision in R. v. Ashlee136 stands in stark contrast to M.S. and 
Edmondson.  In Ashlee, the defendants are convicted for sexually 
touching a woman who, like the complainant in A.R., is both homeless 
and intoxicated.  More than this, Ashlee is a doctrinally significant case 
“account of the personal circumstances” of the defendant, as paraphrased by the Court of Appeal). 
 132. Razack notes a similar double-standard in her analysis of the trial of an aboriginal woman 
beaten to death by two white university students.  Their acts of violence were referred to at trial both 
by the defense and by the deciding judge as “bad behaviour” due to excessive alcohol consumption.  
As she writes, “Alcohol abuse and its accompanying racial and sexual violence were described as 
temporary aberrant behaviour, while Pamela George’s “lifestyle” [her work as a prostitute] 
remained a permanent personal characteristic.”  Razack, supra note 75, at 127.  Interestingly, 
Kovatch, the trial judge in Edmondson, acted as one of the defense counsel in this trial. 
 133. Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270, at ¶ 114 (noting Judge Kovatch’s “account of the personal 
circumstances” of the defendant, as paraphrased by the Court of Appeal). 
 134. Id. at ¶ 20 (quoting sentencing report). 
 135. Bonokoski, supra note 109, at ¶ 46. 
 136. [2006] A.J. No. 1040 (Alta. C.A. Aug. 23, 2006). 
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ving her consent.”  
 
that not only applies the affirmative consent standard, but also 
considerably elevates the requirements of masculine sexual 
responsibility.  What is it that allows for the violation of this risky 
woman to be recognized in law? 
In Ashlee, the complainant was observed lying unconscious on an 
inner city sidewalk with two men fondling her breasts.137  A witness 
called the police and when they arrived five minutes later, they found the 
woman in the same position, her breasts exposed, and each of the men 
with a hand on one of her breasts.138  She was taken to the hospital and 
was still unconscious thirty minutes after she arrived.139  The trial judge 
found the defendants guilty on the basis that the complainant was 
unconscious and, therefore, incapable of consenting.140  On summary 
appeal, the convictions were reversed.141  The deciding judge 
determined that the possibility of “prior consent” raised sufficient 
reasonable doubt: “. . . there is absolutely nothing to suggest that she did 
not consent to the activity at a time when she was still conscious and 
capable of gi 142
At issue in the Court of Appeal was the validity of the defense of 
prior consent in a situation where a complainant is unconscious.143  In a 
stunning decision that will be widely cited in future case law, the Court 
drew upon and elaborated the Ewanchuk standards, unequivocally 
affirming that consent must be ongoing and active at the time of sexual 
contact.144  This decision stands as a firm rejection of the defense of 
prior consent and one of the first clear appellate court rulings defining 
unconsciousness as incapacity.145  As the majority stated, “[c]onsent to 
sexual activity does not remain operative after the person consenting 
becomes unconscious.  Consent is an ongoing state of mind, and 
therefore ends as soon as the complainant falls unconscious and is 
incapable of consenting.  Prior consent is therefore ineffective at 
law. . . .”146  In this unambiguous equation of unconsciousness and 
incapacity, Ashlee consolidates the affirmative and specific consent 
 137. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 138. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at ¶ 2. 
 141. Ashlee, [2006] A.J. No. 1040, at ¶ 2. 
 142. R. v. Ashlee, [2005] A.J. No. 1952, ¶ 16 (ABQB June 9, 2005). 
 143. Ashlee, [2006] A.J. No. 1040, at ¶ 2. 
 144. Id. at ¶ 25. 
 145. CC § 273.1(2)(b) states that “no consent is obtained, for the purposes of [this section], 
where the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity.” 
 146. Ashlee, [2006] A.J. No. 1040, at ¶ 27. 
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standard and elevates the requirements of responsibilized masculine 
sexual subjectivity.  By recognizing that consent is impossible without 
consciousness, it alters the calculus of risk in a transactional sexual 
economy.  The responsibilized masculine subject must actively seek 
consent and must accept that women who become unconscious lack the 
rational capacity to consent.  As the Court states, “[u]nconsciousness is 
the antithesis of an operating state of mind.”147 
The unconscious complainant in Ashlee is thus constituted as being 
inside, rather than external to a normative community of rational and 
responsibilized sexual subjects.  She is distinguished from the 
complainants in M.S. and Ashlee, who, as I have argued, are “Othered” 
and relegated to a space outside of this responsibilized community.  In 
M.S., the complainant’s status as a homeless woman, an addict, the 
occupant of a degenerate space, makes it possible for the deciding judge 
to imagine that she consented to violent sex in a park in a plot to obtain a 
jacket.148  In Edmondson, the child complainant, intoxicated to the point 
of passing out and falling down, was depicted as initiating sex with three 
adult men on the hood of a truck.149  In fact, she was defined as the 
“sexual aggressor.”  Yet in Ashlee, the complainant appears to escape 
the disqualifications experienced by the complainants in M.S. and 
Edmondson and what happened to her is understood as violating and 
exceeding the normative standards of contractual consent.150  In this 
important decision, the majority explicitly measures her experience 
against a “reasonableness” standard, arguing that, “[i]t is highly unlikely, 
bordering on absurd, that a woman would consent, in anticipation of her 
impending unconsciousness, to two men exposing and fondling her 
breast on a public street in broad daylight in downtown Edmonton.”151  
In this way, the complainant in Ashlee becomes aligned with the  
“reasonable woman” and her violation is legally recognized. 
What allows for the complainant in Ashlee to be recognized in law 
as a “victim,” when her risky sisters are relegated to a space of 
“exception” and defined as “risks” to the normative masculine subject?  
The complainant in Ashlee can be recognized as a “victim” only because 
she has disappeared.  The decision in Ashlee is extraordinary because the 
defendants are convicted and these convictions are upheld on appeal 
 147. Id. at ¶ 20. 
 148. M.S., [2003] A.J. No. 1952, at ¶ 57-59. 
 149. Edmondson, 257 Sask. R. 270, at ¶ 54. 
 150. See Ashlee, [2006] A.J. No. 1040, at ¶ 42. 
 151. Id. at ¶ 38. 
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without testimony from the complainant.152  In fact, the complainant did 
not even make a police statement.153  There was, therefore, no 
opportunity to attack her credibility.  The complainant could not be 
constructed as being responsible for her own victimization because she 
was rendered an object.  She becomes reduced to a legal hypothetical.  It 
is this hypothetical state that allows for her to be imagined in relation to 
a community of responsible sexual subjects.  It is this that allows the 
Court of Appeal to draw analogies between her violation and the 
violation of other women.  What Ashlee suggests, especially when read 
together with M.S. and Edmondson, is that extremely vulnerable women 
may have the best chance of having their sexual violation recognized in 
law when they simply disappear. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Canadian socio-legal scholars deploying governmentality theory 
have drawn attention to how law, in and through such practices as the 
enforcement of punitive welfare regimes, actively produces distinctions 
between good neoliberal subjects and “non-citizens,” pathologized by 
their “refusal” to bear responsibility for their own lives.154  As I have 
argued here, the judicial elaboration of affirmative consent standards, 
when read as a technology of neoliberal governmentality, enacts similar 
distinctions.  As judges move towards the embrace of a communicative 
model of consent, the individualizing frame of criminal law is reinforced 
and sexual subjects are responsibilized.  Through responsibilization, 
criminal law engages in a “governmental” project, exercising power as 
much though normalization and the “conduct of conduct” as through 
coercion and punishment.  Within recent judicial discourses, normative 
sexual interaction is reconstructed as being like an economic transaction, 
and privileged actors within a sexual marketplace display behaviors that 
mimic the market citizen of neo-liberalism.  Motivated by a calculus of 
risk, responsibilized masculine sexual subjects are redefined as active 
consent-seekers, while normative feminine sexual subjects are 
constituted as individualized agents of sexual assault prevention, 
diligently self-policing their behaviors to avoid sexual dangers. 
We must be attentive to how this reformulation of normative sexual 
subjects enacts new patterns of exclusion and disqualification.  When the 
idealized rape victim is no longer defined by sexual propriety but by 
 152. Id. at ¶ 51. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See, e.g., Mosher, supra note 80. 
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prudence, the defining characteristics of the unworthy complainant must 
also be rethought.  As I have suggested, women who defy the 
responsibilized standards of feminine safe-keeping are constituted as 
outside of the transactional logics of affirmative consent.  While 
mechanisms of disqualifying “risky women” in law continue to draw 
upon sexualized and racialized constructions, I have drawn attention to 
how these constructions are reframed in and through discourses of 
responsibility and risk.  The legal discourse of affirmative consent enacts 
a separation between discrete events and the power relations 
constructing vulnerabilities.  The latter are silenced, and the constraints 
on action that arise in situations of social marginalization are erased.  In 
this manner, sexual assault is individualized, depoliticized, and 
reconstructed as a failure of responsibilization, while the power relations 
that define sexual violence are obscured.  Vulnerability is reconstructed 
as a failure of responsibility and women who occupy spaces of risk 
become reframed as sexual threats, thereby legitimizing and normalizing 
deviations from responsibilized masculine sexual subjectivity.  As 
Stanko has written, “[w]omen who do not follow the rules for prudent 
behaviour, it is presumed, deserve to be excluded from any benefits of 
public provision of safety. . . .”155  Risky women both fall through the 
cracks of affirmative consent and ground the new negative pole of the 
good victim/bad complainant dichotomy. 
 155. Stanko, supra note 52, at 486. 
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